Raymond Tanter: Regime Change—Baghdad, Cairo, Tehran, and Tunis

Commentary by Professor Raymond Tanter

Like Humpty Dumpty, when dictatorships fall, the landing is often so hard that all the king’s men cannot put the regimes back together again. Just as every war must end, moreover, all dictatorships must fall. The issues are when, how, and whether the landing will be hard or soft. Timing is more difficult to predict than how they fall and whether the landing will be hard or soft. When the people change a regime, as the case of Tunisia, its downfall took about a month.

When external militaries change a regime, as in the March 2003 takedown of Saddam Hussein, the fall was also about a month, but the landing harder because of the occupation of Iraq. But when internal forces change a regime, as in the case of the July 1958 coup in Iraq and September 1969 “bloodless” coup in Libya, the fall comes swiftly and the landing is often softer.

In the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, the term “regime change” suggested taking down a government by invading military forces. The short successful U.S. invasion of Iraq produced a lengthy unsuccessful American-led occupation later, giving “regime change” an appalling name.

A reason for taking down Saddam by external military force, however, was absence of a viable opposition willing and able to do the job from within Iraq.

Other countries have oppositionists eager and capable to take down their rulers. Some, such as Iran, experienced regime change from both outside the country (1953) as well as from within (1979). A cycle of riots and state repression in 1978 culminated in the February 1979 Iranian Revolution. Also giving regime change a bad rap is that intelligence services of London and Washington plotted a 1953 Iranian coup that returned the Shah of Iran to power and toppled its elected nationalist leader—Prime Minister Mossadegh.

Commentaries about Tunisia focus on how rapidly former President of Tunisia, Ben Ali, fell from power. Without a military background, the army failed to back him, and he quickly fled the country. Of critical import was not Tunisia, but whether revolution in Tunis would recur in other Arab states, such as Jordan; but King Abdullah sacked his cabinet and preempted further expressions of discontent after a few demonstrations. And in Egypt, widespread protests against President Hosni Mubarak probably sealed his fate. With a military record, the Egyptian army backed Mubarak, but such support may not be enough to alter the trajectory of his downfall.

The fall of Arab rulers has implications for another Middle East regime that lacks popular legitimacy—Iran. Although it has institutions for bargaining among ruling elites from competing centers of power, Iran is really a dictatorship with complete control over its population, especially its internal opposition. Because domestic Iranian dissidents are under the thumb of the regime, it is critical to open the door to oppositionists outside of Iran, such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, so as to place the survival of the regime’s rule on the table.

Without threatening Tehran with regime change by a coalition of dissidents, Tehran poses a growing threat to moderate Arab states. Sponsoring a Hezbollah takeover in Lebanon, Hamas conquest of the West Bank from Gaza, and domination of post-Mubarak’s Egypt, Tehran would be on a roll. The Islamic Republic of Iran is also poised to foster a sister Islamic Republic of Iraq, which is increasingly vulnerable with the withdrawal of U.S. forces during 2011.

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Dr. Raymond Tanter

Affiliate, Government Department, Georgetown University

Adjunct Scholar, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan

President, Iran Policy Committee

E-mail: raymondtanter@gmail.com